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Despite large amounts invested in rural roads in 
developing countries, little is known about their benefits.  
This paper derives an expression for the willingness-to-
pay for a reduction in transport costs from the canonical 
agricultural household model and uses it to estimate the 
benefits of a hypothetical road project. Estimation is 
based on novel cross-sectional data collected in a small 
region of Madagascar with enormous, yet plausibly 
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exogenous, variation in transport cost. A road that 
essentially eliminated transport costs in the study area 
would boost the incomes of the remotest households—
those facing transport costs of about $75/ton—by 
nearly half, mostly by raising non-farm earnings. This 
benefit estimate is contrasted to one based on a hedonic 
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Transport infrastructure investment in developing countries has received renewed at-
tention in the past decade with greater recognition of the links between high transport
costs and poverty (World Bank, 2007). Yet, despite large amounts spent on rural roads,
remarkably little formal evidence exists on their beneﬁts at the household level. What
has been lacking is a general methodology for estimating these gains using micro-data.1
Measuring the beneﬁt of a road improvement involves more than estimating its various
impacts. Any meaningful measure of welfare beneﬁts must be grounded in a coherent
economic model of the household; in the rural context, the agricultural household. Only
by specifying how a particular road improvement, whether actual or hypothetical, would
change the parameters of such a model, are welfare statements possible.
With its huge portfolio of transport-sector loans, the World Bank has historically
taken the lead in developing appraisal techniques for rural road projects.2 A recom-
mended method for measuring beneﬁts is to estimate the savings in transport costs that
the project would entail, imputing the opportunity cost of travel time to market for house-
holds that do their own transport (see Lebo and Schelling 2001). However, in a setting
where most households purchase transport services indirectly by accepting lower prices
for their outputs (i.e., by selling to collectors at the farmgate or at intermediate points;
see Fafchamps and Hill, 2005), this strategy may seriously understate the demand for
transport. Moreover, a full accounting of the change in surplus due to the road project
must include the gains from the additional economic activity it would generate.
This paper develops beneﬁtm e a s u r e st h a ta r ea t t e n t i v et ob o t ht h e s ei s s u e s . W eu s e
the canonical agricultural model to derive an expression for the willingness-to-pay for a
reduction in transport costs; the area under the appropriately deﬁn e dd e m a n dc u r v ef o r
transport. We also show how this beneﬁt measure is related to one based on a hedonic
approach. Both the ‘direct’ and hedonic beneﬁts can be estimated nonparametrically
using information that is, for the most part, commonly available in household survey
data.
The central empirical obstacle to implementing our measures, and to estimating road
impacts more generally, is reverse causation: Roads are not randomly placed (nor could
they be feasibly randomized by design), and people do not randomly settle next to roads
once they have been constructed. The causal link between better road access and the
beneﬁts of such access may thus be hopelessly obscured. Longitudinal data spanning a
period of road construction can alleviate the endogenous road placement problem insofar
1An exception is Jacoby (2000), who uses a hedonic approach, similar to one derived in this paper, but
based on more specialized assumptions, to estimate road project beneﬁts in Nepal.
2van der Tak and Ray (1971) provide the classic statement of the social surplus approach based on
supply and demand elasticities, although its implementation on micro-data would not be straightforward
and, to our knowledge, has not been attempted.
1as the unobservables determining such placement are ﬁxed over time.3 However, the
time-frame for such evaluations may be too short to capture the long-term adaptations to
lower transport costs (see also Mu and van de Walle, 2007). Moreover, collecting such
data is very time-consuming and expensive, especially given the sample sizes needed to
detect the often subtle impacts of road rehabilitation.
This paper takes a diﬀerent tack. We use a one-shot cross-sectional data set with
a novel sampling scheme. Households were surveyed in a small, relatively homogeneous
region of rural Madagascar, over which transport costs to the same market vary tremen-
dously. This variation is not due to the particularities of road placement — there are no
paved roads and little motorized transport to speak of — but rather to the impenetrable
mountains that range up and down the region. At their peak, transport costs amount to a
staggering 50% of the ﬁnal market price of the primary commodity, paddy rice. Arguably,
a comparison of household behavior along this steep transport cost gradient approximates
the long-run adjustments to an exogenous road improvement.
Nevertheless, to assess the validity of causal inferences about the various impacts of
transport costs drawn from such cross-sectional data, we carry out two tests prior to our
main estimation. The ﬁrst test, presented in section 2, looks for systematic diﬀerences in
land productivity across space. Such diﬀerences might explain why roads are not built into
certain areas, and thus why these areas remain remote. At the same time, location-speciﬁc
productivity may well be correlated with household level outcomes, such as land values,
farm input use and output. The second test is for the presence of systematic diﬀerences in
farm productivity across households at a given location; in particular, between migrant and
native households. Poorer, less able migrants may be attracted to more remote areas by
virtue of cheaper land. This selective migration could make the impacts of inaccessibility
appear greater than they really are.
Before turning to these tests, section 2 describes our data and sampling methodology
in detail. This section also presents a set of stylized facts that undergird our agricultural
household model. Section 3 lays out the model and derives formulae for the willingness-
to-pay for a reduction in transport costs. In Section 4, we implement these formulae using
a nonparametric estimation procedure. Section 5 recaps the results.
3To the extent that road improvements are planned for areas with high expected growth, this assumption
may be invalid. Only a data set that follows the same households over time would be useful for dealing
with selective migration to areas with better road access. Khandker et al. (2006) use such data to
estimate various impacts of road construction in Bangladesh, but they do not provide a comprehensive
beneﬁtm e a s u r e .
22D a t a a n d B a c k g r o u n d
2.1 Setting and sampling
Madagascar is a poor, rugged, and transport-deﬁcient island-nation of Sub-Saharan
Africa. After long years of neglect, the government, supported by international donors,
has recently begun to spend substantially to rehabilitate and expand its road network.
The setting for our study is approximately 50 square kilometers of the Madagascar
highlands, southeast of one of the largest towns in the country, Antsirabe. Households
were surveyed over a broad backward L-shaped swath of countryside from Betafo, a town
just west of Antsirabe, southwards to the environs of Bemaha above the Mania river,
which practically seals oﬀ the region from the south,4 a n dt h e ne a s t w a r d st ot h ei s o l a t e d
village of Andrembesoa and the valleys to its south and east (see ﬁgure 1).
Figure 1: Map of Study Area
For sampling purposes, the study area was divided into three zones according to re-
moteness. The least remote zone, the Betafo-Bemaha axis, consists of four communes
contributing 900 households, or half the sample. Within each commune, ﬁve fokontany
(extended villages) were randomly selected excluding the principal village of the commune
(chef de commune) . T h e n ,w i t h i ne a c ho ft h e s efokontany, ﬁve hamlets were randomly
chosen and a household list drawn up. Nine households were randomly selected from this
list for interview. The second and third zones consist of the remote commune of Andrem-
besoa with its ﬁve fokontany (excluding the chef de commune). Four of these fokontany,
make up our second zone, in which half of all households in each hamlet were randomly
sampled (640 in all). Finally, fokontany Lohandany, nestled in the most westward and
isolated valley on the map, makes up zone three, in which every one of the 258 households
were surveyed.
Although the most distant households in our sample are less than 60 km from Antsirabe
as the crow ﬂies, the walk would take a local person about 3 days. Access to the main
north-south highway in the east is blocked by mountain ranges (see ﬁgure 1). Moreover,
due to the extremely steep terrain, much of the region, outside of the main valleys, is
inaccessible to wheeled transport. Thus, agricultural output must generally be headloaded
to the larger villages (e.g., Bemaha or Andrembesoa) for trans-shipment by ox-cart to the
vicinity of Antsirabe.
Transport cost data are obtained as follows: Key informants in each of the 101 hamlets
were asked about all markets utilized by the inhabitants for selling output, which in many
cases were only intermediate points of sale on the way to Antsirabe. For each market,
4The Mania has no bridges (except on the national highway far to the east) and it is diﬃcult and/or
expensive to organize a crossing by pirogue.
3information was gathered on the price per kilogram of porter services (inclusive of in-kind
payments) and of ox-cart transport, depending on which was available. If both modes
were available, we always took the ox-cart price; human porterage is around 25% more
expensive per hour of travel time than is transport by ox-cart. Transport costs are also
somewhat higher during the wet season, but we use prices in the dry season when most
transport occurs. For hamlets that do not ship directly to Antsirabe, we construct total
costs per kilogram to the ﬁnal market by summing the costs of each leg of the minimum
cost route thereto.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 1761 sampled households according to transport
costs to Antsirabe. The bimodality reﬂects the oversampling of households in the most
remote areas; our sample is not designed to be representative of the spatial distribution
of the region’s population. At any rate, for almost half of our sample, total transport
costs lie in the range of 140-180 ariary per kilogram (2100 ariary = 1 USD) or around 75
USD per ton. By comparison, during harvest season 2006 (April-June), paddy rice sold
for 300-350 ariary/kg in Antsirabe. Nonetheless, as we will see, many of these remote
households still sell rice for export to Antsirabe.
Figure 2: Distribution of Sample Households by Transport Costs
The data collection was split into two rounds to deal with seasonality issues. The
ﬁrst round survey was done in November-December 2005 with a 5-6 month recall to the
previous July, and the second round took place in July-August 2006, covering the period
from the preceding round to the end of June. Thus, overall, the survey has a 12 month
recall from July 2005-June 2006, with main season agricultural production (principally
rice) recorded in the second round and oﬀ-season production (often vegetables) recorded
in the ﬁrst round. Sales of rice and other staples occurring in July, for example, are from
stocks held over from the 2005 harvest, whereas, starting in April, these sales come from
the 2006 harvest. In the ﬁrst round, 1798 households were interviewed, 37 of which, for
various reasons, could not be followed up in the second round.
2.2 How heterogeneous is land productivity across space?
Our ﬁrst task is to assess the exogeneity of transport costs with respect to the house-
hold behaviors and outcomes of interest. This can be done indirectly, by comparing land
productivity across our study area. We have information on rice yield for about 3300
lowland plots cultivated by nearly 1700 households. There are, however, two confounding
factors to consider: First, input use is likely to decline with transport costs. That there
are indeed important diﬀerences in production practices by location is shown in Figure
3. Fertilizers and other modern techniques, such as improved transplanting and weeding
methods, are much less likely to be used on more remote rice plots. A second issue is
4that, during the growing season for which we collected yield data, rainfall was relatively
poor and especially so in the more remote part of our study area.
Figure 3: Use of Agricultural Techniques by Transport Costs
Separating these inﬂuences requires estimating a production function for rice. Let
log yield (assuming constant returns to scale) on plot p of household h depend on a vector
of inputs xhp according to
log(y/a)hp = f(xhp)+ξhp + υh +  hp (1)
where ξhp is an observed plot-speciﬁc weather shock and the error terms νh and  hp repre-
sent, respectively, household and plot-speciﬁc unobservables. We assume that Exhp hp =
0, but that xhp and νh are not necessarily mutually orthogonal. Since there are, on aver-
age, two rice plots per household, we can purge νh using household ﬁxed eﬀects to obtain
consistent estimates of the production function parameters. After estimating equation 1,
we then calculate the residual
b ηhp =e x p ( log(y/a)+l o g ( y/a)hp − b f(xhp) −b ξhp), (2)
which is yield net of variation in weather shocks and input use. Finally, we estimate the
function b η(τ) nonparametrically, where τ is transport costs as shown in ﬁgure 2.
Figure 4 summarizes the results of these procedures (see Appendix for the production
function estimates). The solid curve shows the nonparametric regression of raw rice yield
against τ. The decline in yield is fairly substantial, from around 27 to 20 kg/are, though
not monotonic. Adjusting yields for plot-level weather shocks alone (rainfall worse/much
worse than normal; ﬂooding worse than normal) changes the picture quite dramatically,
resulting in somewhat of a u-shape pattern. While rainfall was generally poor during the
2005-06 rice growing season, self-reported drought conditions were much more prevalent
on remote plots.5
Figure 4: Rice Yield and Transport Costs
The dashed curve in Figure 4 removes the inﬂuence of input use on yields to get at
underlying land productivity. This has the eﬀect of ﬂattening out the yield gradient to
a considerable extent. If anything, rice productivity rises slightly with transport costs,
although this tendency is not statistically signiﬁcant in a linear regression of b ηhp on τ.
Thus, the inaccessibility of the most remote corner of our study area does not appear
5Splitting our sample of rice plots according to whether τ i sa b o v eo rb e l o wt h es a m p l em e d i a n ,w e
ﬁnd that the incidence of worse than normal drought conditions is 65% on remote plots and only 27% on
non-remote plots.
5to be the result of declining land productivity as one approaches it, because underlying
land productivity does not, in fact, decline. This is not to imply that yield, rather than
total output, is the relevant productivity indicator as far as road placement decisions are
concerned. Total rice output of a region depends on yields as well as on the amount
of available lowlands, a dimension along which the narrow valleys around Andrembesoa
are not well endowed. Our point here is that productivity per unit land area is much
more directly tied to the household outcomes of interest, and hence more germane to the
endogeneity issue, than is the total land under cultivation in the region.
2.3 Migration and migrant selectivity
We now consider the endogeneity or selection issues arising from human settlement
patterns. A striking feature of our study area is the extent of in-migration. We use a
loose deﬁnition of migration for the moment, requiring only that the household head was
n o tb o r ni nt h efokontany of current residence. Thus, a child brought into the present
location by his parents several decades ago and now a head of household is still considered
a migrant. This designation yields 477 migrant-headed households compared to 1284
non-migrant. These migrants are largely Merina, the main highland ethnic group, but
also include Betsileo from the neighboring Fianarantsoa province. About half of these
migrant household heads had arrived within the past 15 years.
Figure 5 traces out a dramatic increase in the proportion of migrants with transport
costs; 82% of migrant households in our sample reside in the most remote commune,
Andrembesoa. Evidently, these migrants have been attracted by cheap and/or available
agricultural land rather than by the ‘bright lights’ of the main town, Antsirabe. The
salient question, for our purposes, is whether migrant and non-migrant households diﬀer
substantially. In terms of education, primary school completion rates of household heads
are about equally low; 17% among non-migrants versus 16% among migrants. Similarly,
diﬀerences in land ownership are trivial: Migrant households possess marginally less land
than non-migrants (83.5 versus 86.3 are), whereas they own slightly more of the valuable
lowland (34.3 versus 33.1 are).
Figure 5: Proportion of Migrant Households and Transport Costs
Next, we ask whether migrants are selected on the basis of unobservables that are
relevant to agricultural production. To do so, we calculate a measure of household
farming ability based on the ﬁxed eﬀect, νh, from the rice production function of equation
1. Since our previous, more general, analysis shows that b η0(τ) is approximately zero, we
can already rule out the case where migrant farmers are inferior to non-migrant farmers
and the productivity of a given type is constant over space; had this story been true, then
6b η0(τ) should have been negative. The question we can address here, therefore, is the
extent to which migrants are positively selected on the basis of farming ability.
I nT a b l e1 ,w er e g r e s st h ee s t i m a t e dﬁxed eﬀect on household migrant status and a
full set of hamlet dummies, which purge τ, leaving us with a comparison of average farm
productivity between migrant and native households at each location. Speciﬁcation (1)
indicates that migrant households are indeed positively, albeit weakly, selected, having
nearly 7% higher farm productivity (in terms of rice output per unit area) than non-
migrant households; this diﬀerence is not quite signiﬁcant at the 5% level. A similar
result obtains after controlling for other household characteristics in speciﬁcation (2). It
is also worth asking whether the selection is greater for more recent migrants. So, we
construct a new indicator for household migr a t i o n b a s e do nw h e t h e rt h eh e a dw a so l d e r
than age 18 at the time of the migration. One would expect that someone who migrated
as an adult would be less similar to a native farmer than someone who migrated as a
child and later started his own farm, and hence that the productivity diﬀerential between
native and migrant farmers thus deﬁned would be accentuated. However, speciﬁcations
(3) and (4) of Table 1 show that, if anything, the opposite seems to be the case. There is
essentially no productivity diﬀerence between households whose heads migrated as adults
(18% of the sample) and those households that are either native or whose heads migrated
as children. This result casts doubt on any selection, positive or negative, of households
into remote areas on the basis of farming skills.
Table 1: Migration and Rice Productivity
Since there are few migrants living around Antsirabe, we are less concerned about
selective migration into peri-urban areas on the basis of commercial orientation, entrepre-
neurial ability, or unobserved labor market skills. Insofar as these attributes are correlated
w i t hf a r m i n gs k i l l s ,h o w e v e r ,l a c ko fs e l e c t i o ni no n es u g g e s t sl a c ko fs e l e c t i o ni nt h eo t h e r .
In section 4, we further explore this issue by disaggregating the oﬀ-farm earnings patterns
of migrants and non-migrants.
2.4 Stylized facts
To motivate our model, we now present some stylized facts about the study area. As
is typical of the Madagascar highlands, most crop production by our sampled households
is for subsistence with relatively little sold for cash. Crop sales that do occur tend to
conform to the classic von Thünen pattern of decreasing bulkiness with distance to market
(as also noted by Jacoby, 2000, and Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2003, both in the context of
rural Nepal). For example, among the least remote households (τ<40 ariary/kg), 87%
of crop sales by weight are either fruits, vegetables, or tubers, whereas among the most
7remote households (τ ≥ 160 ariary/kg), 95% of crop sales by weight are high value per
kilogram dry grains (mainly rice, maize, and beans).6
Figure 6 conveys the key features of the market for rice, the main staple. Two-thirds
of annual rice consumption is out of own-stocks held over from the previous harvest. The
balance of consumption, purchased during the lean season, comes largely from sources
within the village (fokontany), especially in the more remote areas. This is not to say that
many remote households sell rice to their fellow villagers during the lean season. Indeed,
as the ﬁgure shows, the bulk of the marketed rice surplus in these areas is exported outside
the fokontany during the few months following the main harvest. Very few households—
presumably, only those with suﬃcient access to credit—would be in a position to hold stocks
throughout the lean season to meet local consumption demand.7 Households residing
in close proximity to Antsirabe, however, have ready access to rice brought in from other
regions of Madagascar (or from other countries) during the lean season. Much of their
purchased rice is obtained from outside the fokontany (presumably from shops near town)
and that which is purchased from within the fokontany mostly comes from local shops
rather than from other households, as is the case in more remote areas.8
Figure 6: Rice Consumption, Purchases, and Sales by Transport Costs
Landholdings are generally quite small, with average operated area of less than a
hectare, divided about 40:60 between irrigated lowlands for rice cultivation and rainfed
uplands. As indicated in Figure 7, land tenancy is extremely limited. Although most land
is acquired through inheritance, a substantial fraction of rice land is purchased, whereas
uplands are more likely to have been originally cleared by the owner, especially in the
more remote areas where there has been much in-migration. Figure 7 also shows that the
average area of rice under cultivation increases with transport costs. Evidently, remote
households are more reliant on rice as a cash crop, and, as already seen, purchase a smaller
fraction of their rice consumption.
Figure 7: Cultivated Area by Transport Cost and Mode of Acquisition
Agricultural labor is the main form of oﬀ-farm employment, done by 68% of households
in the sample; only 23% engaged in any non-agricultural employment. Overwhelmingly,
6We exclude fresh cassava sales from these calculations, which, because of their bulk, take place almost
exclusively on the local market. Thus, our focus here is on ‘exports’.
7Credit constraints appear to be the only plausible explanation for the peculiar behavior of rice-
exporting households: They sell rice just after harvest when the price is low to meet immediate con-
sumption needs and purchase rice in the lean season when the price is high (after exhausting their stocks)
from wages earned during the intervening period.
8Ordering the ﬁve communes in our survey by increasing remoteness, the proportion of households whose
within-fokontany rice purchases were usually obtained from shops/traders as opposed to other households
is 0.90, 0.85, 0.05, 0.27, and 0.16.
8the market for agricultural labor is local. Looking across all agricultural jobs reported in
the employment section of the questionnaire, 97% took place in the fokontany of residence,
as compared to 70% of all non-agricultural jobs. As will be shown in section 4, non-
agricultural earnings decline rapidly with remoteness. This is true of both wage earnings
and net revenue from family enterprises, which, overall, comprises 63% of oﬀ-farm income.
3 Willingness-to-Pay for Transport Cost Reduction
The precise question we address in this section is how to measure welfare gains from
a road project that eﬀectuates a non-marginal reduction in transport costs between a
market town and its surrounding hinterland. We will assume that the area served by
the potential road is ‘small’ relative to the national goods market, wherein the market
town is perfectly integrated. This qualiﬁer puts us squarely within a partial equilibrium
framework, in which goods prices in the market town are ﬁxed. Thus, the approach
developed here may not apply to improvements in a trunk road or in a road network that
could aﬀect prices along its entire extent. Our calculations would be useful, however,
in evaluating a nationwide rural road rehabilitation program that improves many, widely
dispersed, feeder routes.
3.1 Basic framework: Short-run equilibrium
Consider a population of agricultural households facing a variable transport cost of τ
ariary per kilogram of freight shipped to or from the ﬁn a lg o o d sm a r k e to fA n t s i r a b e . F o r
convenience, we index a household’s location in space by τ,but there are many households
at each location. The exogenous distribution of land ownership A at location τ is given
by the cdf F(A). We suppress the locational dependence of this distribution and assume,
without loss of generality, that mean land ownership A is constant, which is tantamount
to assuming uniform population density across space. Later, in examining the long-run
equilibrium, we relax the assumption of ﬁxed population density. Households can also
vary in their labor endowment T, which has distribution function G(T).
Households cultivate a vector of crops Y = {y1,...,y k} a c c o r d i n gt ot h ec o n c a v ep r o -
duction functions yi = fi(ai,l i,q i), where ai,l i, and qi are, respectively, the land area,
labor, and market purchased input (e.g., fertilizer) devoted to crop i. At Antsirabe, crop
prices are given by the vector Px = {px
1,...,p x
k}, so that the eﬀective price facing sellers of
good i at location τ is e px
i = px
i −τ.9 Likewise, since the total weight of the input q =
P
qi
must be imported from the market town, its eﬀective price is e v = v + τ.
9The model thus allows for substitution into less bulky crops as transport costs rise. This can be seen
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9Both farm labor and land rental markets exist. We assume that family labor l
f
i and
hired labor hi are perfect substitutes in each production function; i.e., li = l
f
i +hi.I g n o r i n g
leisure, each household can allocate T units of labor between own farm production and
work on other farms, as long as these other farms are also located at τ.D e n o t e o ﬀ-farm








i <T . Since households cannot hire labor
in and out simultaneously, h · lo =0 , where h =
P
hi.10
Given the above assumptions, household income is
ι = e Px · Y − e vq− w(τ)(l − T) − r(τ)(a − A) (3)
where l =
P
li and a =
P
ai,w (τ) is the local wage and r(τ) land rent. Equilibrium
in the land market requires that optimal cultivated area equal average land ownership,
a(r,w,τ)=A; labor market equilibrium requires that l(r,w,τ)=T. These two conditions
determine how rents and wages vary across space in the short-run (in which A is ﬁxed).
Households are assumed to have convex preferences, represented by the utility function
u = U(X,C,Z), over three types of consumption goods:11 (i) self-produced agricultural
goods X = {x1,...,x k}; (ii) imported bulk goods C = {c1,...,c m}; and (iii) non-imported
goods or non-bulky imports, which, for convenience, we represent by the scalar Z with
price normalized to one. By deﬁnition, goods of type (i) and (iii) do not involve transport
from the ﬁnal market, whereas the household does incur a transport cost for type (ii)
goods; thus, e Pc = {pc
1 + τ,...,pc
j + τ}. In the present context, type (ii) goods could be
items such as rice during the lean season and other foodstuﬀs (cooking oil, ﬁsh) that
are not locally produced. Type (iii) goods would include locally purchased staples (e.g.,
cassava, charcoal) as well as essentially weightless imported items such as cigarettes, tea,
salt, and clothes.
With the separability built into the model, the household can be viewed as ﬁrst choos-
ing {a,l,q,h} to maximize household income (note that l
f
i and hi are not separately deter-
mined when hi > 0, but this is not relevant for anything that we do). In the second stage,
households maximize U(X,C,Z) subject to e Px·X+ e Pc·C+Z = ι∗(e Px,e v,w(τ),r(τ),A,T),
yielding indirect utility V (e Px, e Pc,ι ∗(e Px,e v,w(τ),r(τ),A,T)).
Now let μ(τ,A,T) be the income compensation required make a household with en-
dowment (A,T) and facing the prices, wage, and rent prevailing at location τ indiﬀerent
to the situation prevailing at τ =0 . In other words, μ(τ,A,T) is the equivalent variation
10We do not explicitly accounted for the time households spend taking their harvest to market. While
output is often sold to collectors at the farmgate, much is also headloaded by household members to inter-
mediate collection points for onward shipment to Antsirabe. In this latter case, we make the simplifying
approximation that their opportunity cost of time is identical to the market rate for porterage, which we
observe (when relevant) at each location.
11Earlier transport cost models of Walters (1968) and Gersovitz (1989), albeit not directly concerned
with measuring road beneﬁts, consider only the production side of the farm household, whereas here we
take into account the consumption side as well.
10of a reduction of transport costs from τ to zero and is implicitly deﬁned by the identity
V (e Px, e Pc,ι ∗(e Px,e v,w(τ),r(τ),A,T)+μ) ≡ V (Px,Pc,ι ∗(Px,v,w(0),r(0),A,T)). (4)




yi −q −wτ(τ)(l−T)−rτ(τ)(a−A) and by Roy’s
identity xi = −Vpx
i /Vι and cj = −Vpc
j/Vι, where subscripts denote partial derivatives.








(yi − xi)+q + wτ(τ)(l − T)+rτ(τ)(a − A). (5)
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theorem with s(τ) acting as the ‘demand’ for transport tonnage and τ as its price.12 The
demand for transport has a production component
X
i
yi + q, which only depends on







which depends on both goods prices and income.
Equation 5 represents a partial diﬀerential equation in μ. Solving it for each (A,T)
combination is complicated by the dependence of σ on ι∗ + μ. However, if the income
eﬀect is zero, the beneﬁt of a non-marginal reduction in transport costs from a baseline




[s(τ)+wτ(τ)(l − T)+rτ(τ)(a − A)]dτ. (6)
As our interest is in the average beneﬁt across households, we must also integrate over
the endowment distributions, F and G, which can be done before the integration over τ
in equation 6. Since s does not depend on A and T — a consequence of both separability
between consumption and production decisions and the assumption of zero income eﬀects





Thus, because the average household at each location is neither a net renter of land nor
12For households that do all of their own transport, s(τ) could be replaced by, say, the number of journeys
to the market, with τ then being measured in terms of forgone earnings per journey. The advantage of
our formulation, noted earlier, is its greater generality, being useful in settings where households sell at
the farmgate or at intermediate collection points.
11hirer of labor, the eﬀects of changes in transport costs on wages and rents vanish on
average.
Our beneﬁt measure is then the area under the demand curve for transport, the units
of which are in money (i.e., kg×ariary/kg). The assumption of zero income eﬀects in
consumption is tantamount to using the uncompensated (Marshallian) demand instead of
the compensated (Hicksian) demand to calculate this consumer surplus.13 In principle, it
is possible to allow for income eﬀects in σ, but estimating them reliably would be diﬃcult
because it requires exogenous variation in income that is independent of transport costs.14
Let us compare E [μ(τ0)] to an alternative estimate of the beneﬁts of lower transport
costs that has been proposed implicitly, if not explicitly, in the literature. Consider, as
in, e.g., Gibson and Rozelle (2003) or Khandker et al., (2006), a regression of household
consumption expenditures on τ (or on some other indicator of remoteness). How does
the predicted change in average consumption from τ0 to zero correspond to E [μ(τ0)]?
Suppose, in particular, that we evaluate consumption, f M,a te ﬀective prices e Px and e Pc,
which is, roughly speaking, the conventional method of constructing expenditure aggre-
gates. Now, diﬀerentiate the budget constraint, f M = ι∗, with respect to τ (continuing to


















If, on average, σ<0 , which is a reasonable assumption in our data (see ﬁgure 6 for
the case of rice), then the diﬀerence in average consumption expenditures overestimates








does not take into account substitution
eﬀects in consumption.
To capture the greater non-agricultural labor opportunities found near towns we must,
however, augment beneﬁt formula 7. As noted by Fafchamps and Shilpi (2005), these
opportunities may arise from von Thünen-type transport cost economies or from agglom-
eration externalities (increasing returns to specialization with market size). Ideally, we
would also like an explicit equilibrium model of non-agricultural labor earnings that would
allow us to predict how these earnings change with a reduction in transport costs. How-
ever, not only would such a model require us to take a speciﬁc stand on which of the
complex and poorly understood mechanisms underlies non-agricultural employment in
developing countries, but it would also not be estimable given the structure of the current
data set (i.e., eﬀectively one town). We will have to settle, then, for a ‘reduced-form’
13It also implies that Marshallian consumer surplus, equivalent variation, and compensating variation
all coincide. If the assumption is false, then E [μ(τ0)] is bounded below by the equivalent variation and
bounded above by the compensating variation (see, e.g., Hausman, 1981).
14Even with a good estimate of ∂σ/∂ι,s o l v i n gd i ﬀerential equation 5 is far from trivial, as a practical
matter. For one thing, ι itself also varies with τ .
12approach in this case.
For simplicity, we assume that non-agricultural employment is rationed at a ﬁxed
wage, as in Harris and Todaro (1970) (see Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2005, for some evidence
supporting such model of urban employment in Nepal). Without this assumption, we
would have to explain why households with access to both agricultural and non-agricultural
oﬀ-farm employment choose to do both, which is quite a common situation in the data.
At any rate, letting non-agricultural earnings, e(τ), depend (negatively) on transport costs
captures the higher probability of ﬁnding or being able to partake of such work near the




s(τ)dτ + E [e(0)] − E [e(τ0)]. (9)
3.2 A hedonic approach: Long-run equilibrium
An alternative measure of road beneﬁts uses the hedonic approach based on land
values (see also Jacoby, 2000). For the land value or rent gradient to reﬂect spatial
welfare diﬀerentials requires that households be able to freely migrate across locations.15
In this case, from the ex ante perspective of households deciding where to locate, the land
endowment A is zero. At the same time, however, in-migration entails an ex post fall in
A, or, equivalently, a rise in population density. Since the marginal household must be
indiﬀerent to where it settles and buys or rents land, we have
V (e Px, e Pc,ι ∗(e Px,e v,w(A,T,τ),r(A,T,τ),0,T)) ≡ V (Px,Pc,ι ∗(Px,v,w(0),r(0),0,T)).
(10)
Here we assume, for simplicity, that migrants have the average labor endowment T = T,
and we ignore non-farm employment for the same reason.
Equation 10 implicitly deﬁnes A(τ), average landholdings in long-run equilibrium. Let
dr
dτ = rτ+ dr
dA
dA
dτ be the overall rent gradient, the sum of the short-run gradient introduced
earlier and the long-run eﬀect on rents of changes in population density. Diﬀerentiating
the equilibrium condition with respect to τ and using Roy’s identity once again gives
ι∗










a = s(τ)=E [μτ(τ)]. (11)
Replacing a by A(τ) (they must be the same in equilibrium) and integrating then delivers
15By contrast, much of the urban economics literature treats cities as closed to migration so that land
values do not necessarily reﬂect the diﬀerential beneﬁts from amenties. On this point see Arnott and
Stiglitz (1981), Polinsky and Shavell (1976), as well as the survey of Bartik and Smith (1987).
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Equation 12 says that in the long-run free-migration equilibrium, the overall rent gradient
must reﬂect the short-run beneﬁts of variation in transport costs, as derived above.16
The reason why short-run beneﬁts as measured by formula 7 are the same as the
long-run beneﬁts given in formula 12 is that we are considering average beneﬁts for the
extant population rather than total beneﬁts summed over the whole population.17 Since
migration induces an increase in the number of households wherever transport costs have
been reduced (nonmarginally), the societal beneﬁt to a road improvement has an additional
long-run component (Scotchmer, 1986). However, to take into account the gains from the
redistribution of population across space, one would have to know how total population
varies with τ, which is beyond the scope of the present investigation.
While formulae 7 and 12 should thus produce the same beneﬁt estimates in the context
of our model, in practice they might not. One reason is that diﬀerences in land rent across
space may also reﬂect the beneﬁts of amenities that are related to transport costs, such as
access to social services and other facilities. We return to this point in the next section.
4 Empirical Results
Both of our proposed beneﬁt measures involve integrals of a function g(τ,θ),w h e r e
θ is a vector of household characteristics (endowments, etc.), which may or may not
be observed. The ﬁrst step is to estimate the conditional expectation function b ϕ(τ)=
Eθ [g(τ,θ)|τ] nonparametrically. This means that b ϕ is calculated at a set of K grid-points






b ϕ(τ(k))(τ(k) − τ(k−1)). (13)
16All of our previous results go through in a setting in which new land is being brought into cultivation
(A endogenous), provided that land is not a free resource. In particular, let ψ(A) be the cost of clearing
and making cultivable A units of land. Staying within our static framework, optimal landholdings A
∗
solves ψ0(A)=r and land market equilibrium requires that a(r,w,τ)=A
∗(r). It is easily shown that
neither our direct or hedonic beneﬁt formula are aﬀected by this change. If agricultural land could truly
be cleared at zero marginal cost, then the gains from the expansion of cultivated area would have to be
factored into any calculation of beneﬁts of rural road improvements. Of course, the price of cropland
would eﬀectively be zero in this case, rendering moot the hedonic method based on land values.





dτ . Since, on average, these terms do not enter the beneﬁt calculation
for the extant population, there is no diﬀerence in average beneﬁts between the short-run and the long-run.
14We bootstrap standard errors of our beneﬁt measures, treating fokontany as strata to be
resampled independently, thus preserving the original sample’s geographic distribution.18
By taking zero, or the minimum transport cost, as the lower limit of integration, these
beneﬁt calculations assume that the hypothetical road project renders the most remote
location as accessible to the ﬁnal goods market as the least remote location. Of course,
no road project can literally accomplish this feat. However, given the compactness of our
study area, a good road passing through the most remote hamlet, allowing regular truck
transport by a number of competitive carriers, would go most of the way in this direction.
4.1 Direct beneﬁte s t i m a t e s
The results of our beneﬁt calculations are summarized in Table 2. We ﬁrst use
equation 7, based only on the weight of freight. The production side contribution to
the integrand, s(τ), consists of the sales of crop (except cassava) and livestock products
(principally milk) plus bulk input purchases (chemical fertilizer and seed).19 On the
consumption side, we have to decide which household purchases are imported from the
ﬁnal market (C goods) and which are obtained from local production (Z goods). Thus,
any bulk item purchased outside the fokontany is assumed to be imported from the ﬁnal
market, even if bought in an intermediate market, whereas anything purchased from within
the fokontany is assumed to be from local production. Exceptions to the latter rule are
cooking oil , ﬁsh and ﬂour, which when purchased from fokontany sources are, according
to our data, usually obtained from shops rather than from other households. The case
of rice is more complicated, for reasons already discussed in section 2.4. We assume that
locally purchased rice is purely from local production in the three outlying communes
but purely imported in the two close-in communes (cf. footnote 8). While by no means
perfect, these rules for allocating purchases should provide a reasonable approximation to
the weight of C goods.
Figure 8 presents a nonparametric estimate of s(τ) along with its various subcom-
ponents. All the transport cost gradients are indeed negative, though in the case of
purchased farm inputs the decline with τ is obscured by the overall low level of use.
Figure 8: Weight of Freight and Transport Costs
Using this estimate of s(τ),w eﬁnd that a road improvement making the remotest
18Beneﬁts are likely to be estimated subtantially more precisely than g. To see why, take the case where
g is linear in τ. Suppose that in half the bootstrap samples the estimated slope of g is −a a n di nt h e
other half it is −a/2, a>0, but that the two estimates of g always intersect at the midpoint of [0,τ0].
Thus, while the standard error of the slope is positive, the standard error of the relevant area under g is
zero. More generally, variations in the slope of g will tend to wash out when calculating the integral of
the function.
19Cassava sales are excluded, as are purchases of manure, because these virtually all take place in the
local market and thus do not involve transport.
15hamlet in our sample as accessible as the least remote—equivalent to a reduction in trans-
port costs of about 75 USD/ton—would be worth around 99,000 ariary of annual income.
More than a third of this beneﬁt (37% to be precise) is due to the lower eﬀective price of
imported consumption — the C goods.
To put beneﬁts into relative terms, we calculate a household consumption expenditure
aggregate, f M, valuing consumption of own production using median sales prices in each
commune. A nonparametric estimate of f M(τ), partialling out variation in household size





ariary as an estimate of the annual income of the most remote household, yields a beneﬁt-
income ratio, as shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 2, of 17%.
Table 2: Alternative Beneﬁt Estimates of a Transport Cost Reduction
Next, we incorporate non-farm earnings using the beneﬁtm e a s u r eg i v e nb ye q u a t i o n
9. Earnings are calculated as the sum of all salaries from nonagricultural employment
plus net revenue from family enterprises during the year. The nonparametric estimate
of e(τ) in Figure 9 (again adjusting for household size) conﬁrms a rapid drop-oﬀ in non-
farm opportunities with increased remoteness. The combined beneﬁt-income ratio of the
road improvement, in the second column of Table 2, is 52%. Surprisingly, changes in
eﬀective prices for bulky commodities account for only a third of the beneﬁts of greater
accessibility.
Figure 9: Non-farm Earnings and Transport Costs
Compare this latter beneﬁt ﬁgure to one derived solely from household consumption








−1) should exceed 52%
(cf. equation 8). Indeed, this is precisely what we ﬁnd. The expenditure-based beneﬁt
estimate is 64% of income (with a standard error of around 5%), which is 23% higher than
the one based on the area under the transport demand curve.
4.2 Robustness: Selective migration
We next explore the implications of heterogeneity in transport cost gradients across
migrant and non-migrant households. To ﬁxi d e a s ,l e tm be an indicator for migrant
household and z be a household-level outcome of interest. We may write
E [z|τ]=E [z|τ,m=1 ]P r ( m =1 |τ)+E [z|τ,m=0 ]( 1− Pr(m =1 |τ)), (14)
which expresses the unconditional transport cost function as a weighted sum of the condi-
tional functions for migrant and non-migrant households, where the weight, Pr(m =1 |τ),
is increasing in τ a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e5 . C l e a r l y ,i fE [z|τ,m=0 ]>E[z|τ,m=1 ]∀τ,
16then E [z|τ] is decreasing in τ even if E [z|τ,m=0 ]and E [z|τ,m=1 ]are themselves both
constant.20 For example, if migrants purchase less rice than non-migrants, for whatever
reason, then we would erroneously conclude that overall consumption imports decline with
τ, or that they decline faster than they should. To avoid any such fallacy of composition,
we estimate separate transport cost functions, and corresponding beneﬁt measures, for
migrant and non-migrant households and then sum the two using the estimated migration
probability at the maximum transport cost, τ(K),a st h ew e i g h t .
Following this approach, we recalculate the direct beneﬁt measures in the second row
of Table 2. The results show that not accounting for household migrant status in this
fashion does signiﬁcantly overstate the beneﬁts of transport cost reduction in our sam-
ple, at least at the 10% level (using a conventional t-test with the bootstrapped standard
error of the diﬀerence; see fourth row of Table 2). The main reason for this appears
to be that non-farm earnings fall somewhat more slowly with τ for migrants than for
non-migrants. However, if we redo the calculation with migrants deﬁned as those house-
holds whose heads migrated as adults, the overall beneﬁte s t i m a t ei sq u i t es i m i l a rt oi t s
unadjusted counterpart, at 47% of annual income. Hence, just as in Table 1, and rather
counterintuitively, the evidence for migration selectivity is considerably weakened when
migrants are categorized more strictly.
4.3 Hedonic beneﬁte s t i m a t e s
The hedonic beneﬁt formula relies on the land rent-transport cost gradient. But,
given the limited land rental market in our setting, it would be diﬃcult to estimate a rent
gradient with any precision. Instead, we use reported land values (see Jacoby, 2000, for a
discussion and justiﬁcation of this approach). To convert land values into an annualized
ﬂow that allows comparison with our other beneﬁtm e a s u r e sa sw e l la sw i t hy e a r l yi n c o m e
or expenditures, we need an estimate of the discount rate δ. For this we exploit the simple
present value formula for per are rent, r = δV, where V is the reported value per are of
the plot. In our sample of 333 rented plots, the median value of r/V is 0.11; a practically
identical estimate of δ emerges from a regression analysis on the same sample.21
We estimate separate nonparametric regressions of the land value gradient for lowland
and upland plots. To deal with heterogeneity in land quality, we control for observed plot
20In the special case where the transport cost gradient is a constant α and where E [z|τ,m=1 ]−
E [z|τ,m=0 ]=β, the problem boils down to one in which the true regression model is z = ατ + βm+ u
and m is an omitted variable. In the general case, equation 14 can be viewed as a semiparametric switching
regression model. Given lack of migrant selectivity on the basis of unobservable agricultural productivity
(cf. Table 1), the diﬃculty of estimating endogenous switching models, and the exploratory nature of this
analysis, we assume that the switching is exogenous.
21Speciﬁcally, we regress r (including the value of in-kind rent payments) on V (missing values imputed
using information on type of plot, plot area, and τ) without a constant term (null of zero constant cannot
be rejected with p-value=0.17). In this regression, we instrument V for measurement error using plot
area. The coeﬃcient on V is 0.113 with a standard error of 0.014.
17characteristics using a partially linear regression. In the case of lowland plots, we have
plot topography, soil type, type of irrigation, irrigation water availability, and frequency
of ﬂooding (see Appendix for details). For the rainfed upland plots, we only collected
information on plot topography. The estimation sample consists of 2767 lowland plots
and 2976 upland plots.
Figure 10 shows the nonparametric land value gradients. For lowlands, there appears
to be a precipitous rise in land values within a relatively short distance of Antsirabe,
followed by a steady decline as transport costs increase. Upland plots, which are of much
lower average value than rice plots in general, do not display this marked initial rise. Our
survey enumerators indicated that rice plots in the commune of Belazao, the one nearest
to Antsirabe, were considered inferior to other lowlands in the region. Indeed, after
dropping the 11% of lowland plots contributed by households from Belazao, the anomalous
result largely disappears and the land value-transport cost relationship becomes practically
monotonic. In our hedonic beneﬁt calculations, therefore, we eliminate households from
Belazao, there being still plenty of close-in households to spare in our sample.
Figure 10: Value of Lowland and Upland Plots and Transport Costs
To calculate the integral in equation 12, we multiply the plot-type speciﬁc value gradi-
ent by the discount rate and the respective estimate of A for each type of land, add these
two numbers together at each grid-point, and then form the weighted sum over grid-points
as shown in equation 13. The result of this calculation is reported in the last column of
Table 2, and it is comparatively large. The hedonic beneﬁte s t i m a t ef o rt h em o s tr e m o t e
households is 607,000 ariary per year, or 104% of annual income.
Given the proportionality implied by the present value formula, however, the absolute
level of beneﬁts derived from any hedonic method based on land values will clearly be
sensitive to assumptions about the discount rate. Jacoby (2000), for example, estimates
a discount rate of only 6% in rural Nepal. Setting δ =0 .06 in the present case would
practically equalize the hedonic and direct estimates of road beneﬁts.
Aside from assumptions about the discount rate, the discrepancy between our hedonic
and direct estimates could be due to locational amenities correlated with transport costs.
As mentioned earlier, the hedonic beneﬁt impounds the value of such amenities. One
urban amenity that cannot reconcile the two beneﬁt measures, though, is greater access
to labor market opportunities; non-farm employment earnings are already incorporated
into our direct beneﬁte s t i m a t e s .
What about diﬀerences in access to social services? Although primary schools are
present in every fokontany in our study area, secondary schooling is only available near
Antsirabe. Consequently, the secondary school enrollment rate for children 13-18 years-
old is 31% among close-in households (τ<40) compared to only 8% for remote households
18(τ ≥ 160). Nevertheless, given such low overall enrollment, it seems diﬃcult to explain
the large gap between direct and hedonic beneﬁts on this basis alone. As for medical
care, there is little diﬀerence across locations in the proportion of households visiting a
health clinic during the year.
Another advantage of being near town might be access to ﬁnancial services, especially
formal credit sources. But, again, there is very little formal credit reported in our data;
only 25 households had any such debt in the two years preceding the survey and even
these households are not heavily concentrated around Antsirabe. We can also ask about
agricultural extension services. Although only 9% of households overall reported receiving
an extension visit in the last ﬁve years, these are indeed much rarer in the more remote
areas. However, in an analysis of rice productivity, similar to that done for migration in
Table 1, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact of extension visits on yields conditional on transport
costs. Thus, it appears unlikely that a substantial component of our hedonic beneﬁte s t i -
mate reﬂects the demand for social, ﬁnancial, or extension services, although we certainly
cannot rule out the possibility of some other, unobserved, urban amenities.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Evaluating the impact of transport infrastructure poses considerable empirical chal-
lenges. ‘Natural’ experiments involving large, permanent, changes in transport costs (and
only in transport costs), for which the long-run equilibrium is observed both before and af-
ter the intervention, are indeed rare, if not nonexistent. In this paper, we have attempted
to circumvent this problem by collecting cross-sectional data in a region over which, due to
the vagaries of topography, the ratio of transport costs to the main staple price varies from
0.05 to 0.5. Analysis of spatial patterns in the productivity of this staple shows that, at
least on this important dimension, the sample area is relatively homogeneous. While this
may alleviate concerns about reverse causation, the possibility that the transport cost
gradients estimated in this paper are contaminated by other unobservable correlates of
accessibility can never be ruled out entirely. Putting aside this caveat, our chief interest
here has not been to catalogue the multifarious impacts of changes in transport costs, as
much as to measure the potential welfare beneﬁts of rural roads within a coherent and
generalizable economic framework.
Based on our preferred direct beneﬁt estimate, a hypothetical rural road project that
reduces the transport costs of the most remote households by around 75 USD per ton
would raise their incomes by about 50 percent. But the gain due to the reduction in
the cost of goods transport, both exports and imports, is small compared to that from
improved access to non-farm earnings opportunities in town. This suggests that there may
be potentially important complementarities between rural road construction and urban
19economic development.
We also present results from a hedonic approach. Given the apparently limited rel-
evance of locational amenities, this beneﬁt estimate should be similar to that obtained
f r o mt h ed i r e c ta p p r o a c h . I tt u r n so u tt ob es ubstantially larger, but the comparison
between the two measures is heavily dependent on the chosen discount rate. Needless
to say, replication of the methodology developed in this paper across diﬀerent settings
would enhance our understanding of both the size and composition of the beneﬁts of rural
roads.
We close with the observation that the beneﬁts from road construction are generally
not equally distributed; it is obviously the most remote households that have the most
to gain from improved access. Even though land rents may adjust so as to dissipate the
net beneﬁts for incoming migrants, and drive the gains to zero at the margin, incumbent
landowners are unambiguously better oﬀ from a road improvement. Thus, to the extent
that remote households are poorer to begin with, a policy of building rural roads can have
desirable distributional properties (a point elaborated on at length in Jacoby, 2000). A
related issue, however, is that, by rewarding incumbents, road building may encourage
too much migration into remote areas, whether in anticipation of a road being built or,
especially where land for new settlement is still available, after a road project has been
announced. The implications of this form of rent-seeking for public investments and
spatial development are potentially far-reaching, but go well beyond the purview of the
present paper.
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Table 1:  Migration and Rice Productivity 
  Means   (1)  (2)   (3)   (4)  
Head migrated  0.27  0.069  0.065  ---  --- 
   (0.038)  (0.036)    
       
Head migrated as an adult  0.18  ---  ---  0.019  0.013 
(older than age 18)        (0.036)  (0.034) 
       
Head completed primary   0.16  ---  -0.019  ---  -0.016 
school     (0.034)  (0.034) 
       
Head  is  female  0.08  --- 0.097 --- 0.098 
     (0.057)  (0.056) 
       
Head’s  age  40.8  --- 0.005 --- 0.005 
  (14.3)   (0.005)  (0.005) 
       
Head’s age squared    ---  -0.000  ---  -0.000 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
       
Number of household   3.2  ---  0.004  ---  0.003 
members older than 12  (1.6)    (0.008)    (0.008) 
Notes:  Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by hamlet) in parentheses.  D e p e n d e n t  
variable is the estimated household fixed effect from the rice production function (see Appendix).  
All specifications include hamlet fixed effects and use a sample of 1681 households.




Table 2:  Alternative Benefit Estimates of a Transport Cost Reduction 
Benefit /income   
Freight only  Freight & non-farm earnings  Hedonic 
(1)  Unadjusted  0.170  0.518  1.039 
 (0.006)  (0.048)  (0.029) 
      
(2)  Adjusted for migration  0.143  0.422  --- 
 (0.010)  (0.062)   
      
(3)  Adjusted for migration  0.147  0.475  --- 
as adult  (0.008)  (0.064)   
      
(1) – (2)  0.026  0.096  --- 
 (0.009)  (0.051)   
      
(1) – (3)  0.023  0.043  --- 
 (0.007)  (0.047)   
Notes:  Bootstrapped standard errors (in parentheses) treat each of the 25 fokontany as a separate strata.     
Figures in the first, second, and third columns are based on formulae 7, 9, and 12, respectively.  Benefit is 
defined as the compensating variation required to make households in the least remote location (τ = 15 
ariary/kg) indifferent to residing in the most remote location (τ = 178 ariary/kg).   Estimation of annual income 
for the most remote households is described in the text.  For the hedonic measure, the least remote location has 
τ = 22.5 ariary/kg because all plots in the close-in commune of Belazao were dropped for reasons discussed in 
the text.  Migration adjustment estimates benefits separately for migrant and non-migrant groups and takes the 
weighted sum of the results, with weights equal to the probability of being a migrant evaluated at the most 
remote location (see text). 
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  Figure 8:  Weight of Freight and Transport Costs 
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  Figure 10:  Value of Lowland and Upland Plots and Transport Costs 
  29Appendix:  Estimates of Rice Production Function 
 (1)  (2) 
drought much worse than expected  -0.831 -0.712 
 (0.057)  (0.056) 
drought worse than expected  -0.208 -0.141 
 (0.037)  (0.037) 
log(kg of seed/are + 1)  ---  0.398 
   (0.066) 
any chemical fertilizer  ---  0.097 
   (0.066) 
log(kg of manure/are + 1)  ---  0.008 
   (0.006) 
log(hours of animal traction/are + 1)  ---  0.177 
   (0.065) 
log(days of labor/are + 1)   ---  0.406 
   (0.051) 
modern transplanting technique  ---  0.095 
   (0.059) 
multiple weedings  ---  0.206 
   (0.057) 
irrigation – traditional  ---  0.013 
   (0.034) 
irrigation – source   ---  0.108 
   (0.040) 
topography – base of hill  ---  -0.041 
   (0.025) 
topography – terraced   ---  -0.003 
   (0.030) 
black soil
a  ---  0.077 
   (0.021) 
water availability index
a  ---  -0.056 
   (0.020) 
flooding frequency index
a  ---  -0.004 
   (0.013) 
H0: random effects (p-value)  0.103  0.0000 
Effective sample size  2647  2638 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.   All specifications include household fixed effects.   
Effective sample drops plots of households contributing only a single rice plot.  Dependent 
variable is the log of rice yield (kg/are).  Details of selected independent variables:  Drought 
perception is plot-specific self-report (omitted category: drought normal or better than expected).  
Chemical fertilizer quantity not included because normal practice is to apply very small amounts 
to seedbed prior to transplanting.  Modern transplanting is either in-line or SRI (mostly the 
former) as opposed to transplanting in bunches.  Irrigation is either by traditional method, from a 
water source, or rainfed (omitted category).  For topography, omitted category is bottom land.  For 
soil, omitted category is red or brown.  Water availability index takes on values 1-5, with 1 being 
always available and 5 being never available. Flooding frequency index takes on values 1-4, with 
1 being frequent and 4 being never. 
 
a
These variables are treated as fixed plot characteristics, not subject to intervention by the farmer; 
hence they are not netted out of adjusted yield  hp η ˆ  (see equation (12) in text). 
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